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COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT MURK: MURPHY
V. MILLENNIUM RADIO GROUP AND THE
ENCROACHMENT OF THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT INTO THE
ANALOG REALM
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA")' in 1998 to provide effective legal protection for
technological safeguards against digital piracy.2 Section 1201 of
the Act prohibits the circumvention of "technological measure[s]
that effectively control access to a work,"' while the lesser-known
§ 1202 protects the "integrity of copyright management
information."' In Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group, the Third
Circuit held that a credit in a print magazine qualified as protected
copyright management information ("CMI") under § 1202.' In the
wake of this holding, there was a perceived dissonance that the
DMCA could apply to analog works and safeguards.'
CMI is usually understood as any piece of information that
either helps identify the work or the right holder, or manages
rights.' Nonetheless, courts have expressed differing opinions as
to the scope of CMI protected by § 1202.8 The plain language of §
1202 appears to protect all CMI regardless of form, and most
1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 102, 112 Stat.
2860 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C).
2. See Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir.
2011).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
5. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 305.
6. See, e.g., Tom Casagrande, 3d Circuit: Removal of Non-Digital Author
Info Violates DIGITAL Millennium Copyright Act, LIKELY TO BE CONFUSED -THE SOFTER
SIDE OF IP LAW
(June
15, 2011, 2:41
PM),
http://secondarymeaning.blogspot.com/2011/06/3d-circuit-removal-of-nondigital.html.
7. S6verine Dusollier, Some Reflections on Copyright Management
Information andMoral Rights, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 379 (2003).
8. Greg Lastowka, DigitalAttribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87
B.U. L. REv. 41, 71 (2007).
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courts have, at least in dicta, interpreted the § 1202 definition of
CMI broadly to incorporate analog forms of copyright within its
scope.' However, several district courts have narrowly interpreted
the statute to hinge protection on CMI's function and the
circumstances of its removal. For example, in IQ Group, Ltd. v.
Wiesner Publishing, LLC the New Jersey District Court
emphasized the digital focus of the DMCA's legislative history
and statutory structure in concluding that § 1202 only protects
CMI that functions as part of "technological measures of
automated systems," which are afforded protection under § 1201.0
The Central District of California also looked to legislative intent
in Textile Secrets International, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc.,
concluding that § 1202 does not "apply to circumstances that have
no relation to the Internet, electronic commerce, automated
copyright protections or management systems, public registers, or
other technological measures or processes as contemplated in the
DMCA as a whole."" Murphy marks the first time an appellate
court has grappled with whether § 1202(c)'s definition of CMI is
restricted to the digital contexts described in IQ Group and Textile
Secrets.12
Part II of this case note provides a brief overview of the
legislative background and content of § 1202. Part III summarizes
the Third Circuit's decision in Murphy v. Millennium Radio
Group. Part IV considers the Third Circuit's broad interpretation
of § 1202 within the context of legislative history, and posits that a
narrower interpretation akin to Textile Secrets is more proper.
Finally, Part V considers the practical impact of Murphy on
litigation and suggests that the Third Circuit's decision opens the
door for legal intimidation and heightened settlements in cases of
completely analog acts of infringement.

9. Id. at 71-72.
10. IQ Grp., Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ'g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (D.N.J.
2006).
11. Textile Secrets Int'l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184,
1201 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
12. See Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302.
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§ 1202

A. The InformationInfrastructureTask Force White Paper
The statutory language of § 1202 has its origins in a 1995 white
paper prepared by the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights.' This working group formed as a subcommittee of the
Information Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF"), which the Clinton
Administration commissioned in 1993 "to develop comprehensive
telecommunications and information policies and programs that
will promote the development of the [National Information
Infrastructure] and best meet the country's needs."" The stated
aim of the white paper was "to discuss the application of the
existing copyright law and to recommend only those changes that
are essential to adapt the law to the needs of the global information
society."
Section 1202, both as enacted and as proposed in the white
paper, prohibits the falsification, alteration, or removal of any
CMI.16 The white paper's proposed statutory text defines CMI, in
part, as "the name and other identifying information of the author
of a work."" The white paper itself explicitly notes that the above
definition is not limited to such information that is included in or
digitally linked to a copyrighted work; all such information,
regardless of form, would be protected.'
The white paper's proposed statutory definition of "copyright
management information" focuses on the objective forms and
types of information that qualify as CMI, but is silent on CMI's
function; in other words, it defines what CMI is, but not what it

13. See IQ Group, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
14. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK

FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (1995) [hereinafter
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/
WHITE PAPER],

ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Compare WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 236, with 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
17. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, app. 1 at 7.

18. Id. at 236.
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does. 9 Fortunately, the white paper itself provides some guidance
on this question.
The white paper conceptualizes CMI as information that
facilitates licensing or regulated use of protected works.20 The
white paper first discusses CMI as an evolved form of notice.2'
Prior to the United States' 1989 accession to the Berne convention,
notice of copyright was required on all distributed copies of a
work; failure to affix notice could result in a loss of copyright
protection.22 Following the Berne Convention, however, notice
became permissive rather than required.23 The white paper notes
that the Copyright Act's lack of notice and registration
requirements may make it hard to differentiate between protected
and unprotected works, and may also make it more difficult for
potential licensees to identify the copyright owner, especially on
the Internet.24 Rather than reinstate a notice requirement to allay
these difficulties, the white paper argued that "the benefits of
utilizing [CMI] should encourage copyright owners to include or
affix information historically included in copyright notices." 25
Rights owners would primarily yield these benefits by the
implementation of CMI in so-called "rights management
systems,"26 wherein CMI would serve to "inform the user about the
19. See id. app. I at 7.
20. See id. at 235 ("Copyright management information will serve as a kind
of license plate for a work on the information superhighway, from which a user
may obtain important information about the work. The accuracy of such
information will be crucial to the ability of consumers to find and make
authorized uses of copyrighted works on the [National Information
Infrastructure]. Reliable information will also facilitate efficient licensing and
reduce transaction costs for licensable uses of copyrighted works . . . ."); see
also id. at 53 ("The inclusion of copyright management information in copies of
works will also facilitate licensing.").
21. See id. at 63.
22. Id. at 60.
23. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 60.

24. Id. at 62.
25. Id at 63.
26. See id. at 191 ("Systems for managing rights in works are being
contemplated in the development of the [National Information Infrastructure].
These systems will serve the functions of tracking and monitoring uses of
copyrighted works as well as licensing of rights and indicating attribution,
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authorship and ownership of a work . . . [and] indicate authorized

uses of the work." 27 The white paper goes on to describe CMI
playing both active and passive roles in such systems. In the
active role, a computer processes the CMI to license or control
access to the associated work.28 In the passive role, the rights
management system merely conveys the electronically packaged
CMI to the user. 29 Regardless, the user does not need to seek out
the usage and licensing information, and at some point the
information is processed by a system. For this reason, courts have
classified the passage's described rights management systems as
automated.30
B. The World IntellectualProperty OrganizationTreaties
While the IITF white paper circulated amongst legislators, the
United States signed on to two World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") treaties in December 1996 pertaining,
respectively, to Copyright" and Performances and Phonograms.3 2
The two WIPO treaties do not refer to "copyright management
information," but instead offer substantively identical provisions
creation and ownership interests. A combination of file- and system-based
access controls using encryption technologies, digital signatures and
steganography are, and will continue to be, employed by owners of works to
address copyright management concerns.").
27. Id. at 191.
28. The white paper anticipates the development of electronic licensing
systems. Id. For a contemporary overview of these electronic licensing
systems, see Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management
Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161,
162-63 (1997). CMI may also play an active role in digital watermarking and
encryption systems. See Dusollier,supra note 7, at 380-82.
29. For instance, the white paper describes the packaging of CMI in an
"electronic envelope," which the user may open to read about the work and its
rights information. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 191.

30. See IQ Grp., 409 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (interpreting the white paper
passages referenced supra notes 27-29).
31. WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 12, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10517, at 1, 11 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright].
32. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 19, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 18, 36 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO PPT].
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for the protection of the similarly defined "rights management
information" ("RMI"). The differences between the definitions
are slight; the more significant break between the treaties and the
proposed white paper legislation comes not in their respective
definitions of CMI and RMI, but in the scope of protection
afforded such information.
The WIPO treaties only require
contracting parties to provide adequate and effective legal
remedies against the removal or alteration of electronic rights
management information.34 Thus, presuming that CMI and RMI
referred to essentially the same things, the statutory text
recommended by the IITF offered far broader protection than that
required by the WIPO treaties because the IITF proposal protected
allforms of CMI-electronic and not.

33. WIPO Copyright, supra note 31, at 11; WIPO PPT, supra note 32, at 37.
The complete treaty definition of "rights management information" reads, "[a]s
used in this Article, 'rights management information' means information which
identifies the work, the author of the work, the owner of any right in the work,
or information about the terms and conditions of use of the work, and any
numbers or codes that represent such information, when any of these items of
information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the
communication of a work to the public." Id.
34. WIPO Copyright, supra note 31, at 11 ("Contracting Parties shall provide
adequate and effective legal remedies against any person knowingly performing
any of the following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having
reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an
infringement of any right covered by this Treaty or the Berne Convention: (i) to
remove or alter any electronic rights management information without
authority; (ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or communicate to
the public, without authority, works or copies of works knowing that electronic
rights management information has been removed or altered without
authority.")
35. Congress certainly believed the terms synonymous. See SEN. ORRIN
HATCH, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, S. REP. No. 105-

190, at 11 n.18 (2008) ("Rights management information is more commonly
referred to in the U.S. as copyright management information.").
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C. The DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct
Driven, in part, by the need to comply with the WIPO treaties,36
Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
in October 1998 with the stated aim to "facilitate the robust
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education in the
digital age.""
Section 1202 of the DMCA is essentially a hybrid text that
draws substantially from the IITF white paper proposal and the
WIPO treaties. For the purposes of this note, it is imperative to
observe that subsections 1202(a)3 8 and 1202(b)," which together
prohibit the falsification, alteration and removal of CMI, do not
expressly limit protection to electronic CMI. Furthermore, §

36. David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History The Sweet and Sour
Spots of the DMCA 's Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 915-16 (2002).
37. HATCH, supra note 35, at 1-2.

38. The subsection provides, in full: "(a) False Copyright Management
Information.-- No person shall knowingly and with the intent to induce, enable,
facilitate, or conceal infringement-- (1) provide copyright management
information that is false, or (2) distribute or import for distribution copyright
management information that is false." 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a).
39. The subsection provides, in part:
(b) Removal or Alteration of Copyright Management
Information. No person shall, without the authority of the
copyright owner or the law-(1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright management
information,
(2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management
information knowing that the copyright management
information has been removed or altered without authority of
the copyright owner or the law,
knowing that copyright management information has been
removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner
or the law, knowing, or, with respect to civil remedies . . . ,

having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce,
enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement of any right
under this title.
Id. § 1202(b).
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1202(c)40 expressly includes digitally formatted CMI in its
statutory definition of the term, but does not limit the definition to
CMI in digital form.4 Thus, like the white paper's proposed
statute, the enacted § 1202's plain language protects a far broader
scope of CMI than that required by the WIPO treaties because
CMI is not expressly limited to electronically formatted
information. However, it should be noted that the scope of
protection afforded to CMI is nevertheless limited by the mental
elements incorporated in subsections (a) and (b), which generally
require intentional falsification or removal, and knowledge that
such act will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement.42
Thus, the statute does seemingly limit the application of its broad
definition.
Also of note, subsection (d) exempts law enforcement and other
governmental agents from liability under the subsection.4 3 Finally,
subsection (e) creates separate liability exemptions for analog and
40. The subsection provides, in part:
(c) Definition. As used in this section, the term "copyright
management information" means any of the following
information conveyed in connection with copies or
phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a
work, including in digital form, except that such term does not
include any personally identifying information about a user of
a work or of a copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of
a work:
(1) The title and other information identifying the work,
including the information set forth on a notice of copyright.
(2) The name of, and other identifying information about, the
author of a work.
(3) The name of, and other identifying information about, the
copyright owner of the work, including the information set
forth in a notice of copyright.
(7) Identifying numbers or symbols referring
information or links to such information.

to such

Id. § 1202(c).
41. The Senate report makes this clear: "CM1 need not be in digital form, but
CMI in digital form is expressly included." HATCH, supranote 35, at 16.
42. See 17 U.S.C § 1202(a)-(b).
43. Id. § 1202(d).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss2/7

8

Dickinson: Copyright Management Murk: Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group and t

2012]

MURPHY V. MILLENNIUM RADIO GROUP

493

This note will focus on the analog
digital broadcasters.4
exemption. Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) provides that an analog
broadcaster will not be held liable for violating provisions of
subsection (b) if it is not "technically feasible" for that person to
avoid the violation, or if avoiding the violation would "create an
undue financial hardship."45 For example, a broadcaster who
interrupts a broadcast of a motion picture for a news bulletin,
thereby deleting part of the motion picture's credits, would not fall
within the prohibition.46 Broadcasters may also remove or alter
credits that are of an "excessive duration in relation to standard
practice in the relevant industries" if broadcasting the credits in
full would create undue financial hardship. 47 However, these
limitations on liability only apply if the broadcaster did not intend,
by engaging in such activity, to induce, enable, facilitate or
conceal infringement.48
1II. SUBJECT CASE: MURPHY V. MILLENNIUM RADIO GROUP

Murphy marks the first time an appellate court has grappled with
whether § 1202(c)'s definition of CMI applies outside the context
of automated copyright protection systems, 49 and is significant
because the Third Circuit rejected the narrower interpretations
adopted by the lower courts in IQ Group and Textile Secrets.
Under Murphy,
CMI . . . is not restricted to the context of

'automated copyright protection or management
systems.' Rather, a cause of action under § 1202 of
the DMCA potentially lies whenever the types of
information listed in §§ 1202(c)(1)-(8)

. . . is

44. Id. § 1202(e).
45. Id.
46. Hearing on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Prop., 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Peters Statement]
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/4012.htm.
47. HATCH, supra note 35, at 37.

48. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(e)(1)(b).
49. See Murphy, 650 F.3d 295 at 302.
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falsified or removed, regardless of the form in
which that information is conveyed."
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
Plaintiff Peter Murphy ("Murphy"), a professional photographer,
was hired by the print magazine New Jersey Monthly ("NJM') to
photograph shock jocks Craig Carton and Ray Rossi for an
article. 5' Murphy retained the copyright to the photograph ("the
Image"), and received a gutter credit52 in the magazine identifying
him as the Image's author."
At the time, Carton and Rossi were the hosts of a show on the
New Jersey radio station WKXW, which is owned by the
defendant Millennium Radio Group ("MRG").5 4
Following
publication of the photograph in NJM, an unknown employee of
WKXW scanned and, without Murphy's consent, posted an
electronic copy of the Image to the station's website and to
myspacetv.com." The posted copies cropped off the gutter credit
that identified Murphy as the photographer.
Spurred by these unauthorized postings and some negative onair remarks about him by Carton and Rossi, Murphy brought
causes of action against MRG, Carton, and Rossi ("the Station
Defendants") for violations of § 1202 of the DMCA, copyright
infringement, and defamation." This note will focus on Murphy's
§ 1202 claim.
The District Court granted MRG's motion for summary
judgment on all claims," holding that application of DMCA to a

50. Id. at 305.
51. Id. at 298.
52. A gutter credit is a credit placed in the inner margin, or "gutter," of a
magazine page, that runs perpendicular to the relevant image. Id. at 299.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 298.
55. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 299.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 299.
58. Id. at 299-300.
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print magazine credit would disregard the digitally-focused
statutory intent of the Act.5 9 Murphy appealed.6 0
B. Third Circuit'sDiscussion
DMCA subsection 1202(c)(2) lists "[t]he name of, and other
identifying information about, the author of a work" in the
definition of CMI so long as such information is "conveyed in
connection with copies . . . of a work."6' Murphy argued that, by
the plain language of this provision, the NJM gutter credit
qualified as CMI because it identified Murphy as the
photographer-i.e. author-of the Image, and the credit was
conveyed in connection with copies of the Image.62 The Station
Defendants countered that § 1202 cannot be read in isolation, but
must be interpreted in the context of the DMCA as a whole, with
particular emphasis on § 1201, and in light of the statute's
Interpreted in this light, the Station
legislative history.63
Defendants argued that the DMCA only protects CMI that
functions as part of an automated system for protecting and
managing copyrights.6 4 The court ran through the following
exercises in statutory interpretation, and addressed certain policy
concerns in dicta.
1. The PlainLanguage of§ 1202(c) is Unambiguous
The Third Circuit found the language of § 1202(c) unambiguous
when read in isolation: the text imposes no requirement that the
enumerated information must function as part of an automated
system to qualify as CMI.65 Indeed, the Third Circuit found the

59. Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, No. 08-1743, 2010 WL
1372408, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2010).
60. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 300.
61. 17 U.S.C § 1202.
62. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 301.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 302.
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language to be extremely broad, with no restrictions on the context
in which information must be used in order to qualify as CMI.66
2. The PlainMeaning of§ 1202(c) is Still Unambiguous When
Viewed in the Context of the DMCA as a Whole
Unlike the courts in IQ Group and Textile Secrets, the Third
Circuit did not find the § 1202(c) definition of CMI ambiguous
when considered in the context of the DMCA as a whole.67
Defendants argued that because § 1202 falls under a chapter titled
"Copyright Protection and Management Systems," CMI must
necessarily refer to information that operates within such a
system. 68 Defendants further argued that § 1202 was drafted to
work in tandem with § 1201, which guards "technological
measure[s] that effectively control access to a work . . . [or]

protect[] a right of copyright owner, "69 and that when interpreted in
this context, it is obvious that § 1202(c)'s definition of CMI is
limited to information that functions as part of an automated
copyright management system."o Defendants relied upon the
District Court's opinion in IQ Group to articulate this argument:
[Sections 1201 and 1201] are sections within a
common chapter (chapter 12,
"Copyright
Protection and Management Systems") and the two
66. Id.
67. See id. at 303.
68. Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff s Appeal at 10, Murphy, 650
F.3d 295 (No. 10-2163), 2010 WL 4160869 [hereinafter Def. Brief].
Defendants argued,
[t]he words 'Management Systems have to be taken seriously
- both of them. The title, and the word 'systems,' apply to
both §1201 (sic) and 1202, not just to 1201 as Plaintiff would
have it. Section 1201 focuses on systems that offer protection
to copyrighted material (e.g. encoding and encryption
systems), while § 1202 focuses on systems used in the
management of this copyrighted material - systems that
employ Copyright Management Information to protect and
facilitate electronic transactions in copyrighted material.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b).
70. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 303.
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provisions covered by the remedies and penalty
provisions of §§ 1203 and 1204. Chapter 12, as a
whole appears to protect automated systems which
The systems
protect and manage copyrights.
themselves are protected by § 1201 and the
copyright information used in the functioning of the
systems is protectedin § 1202."
Defendants, thus, argued that the DMCA's structure shows that

§ 1202 must apply only to technological systems for the protection
and management of copyrights; in other words, contrary to the
apparent plain language of the section, CMI is not meant to apply
to every piece of "information" related to every possible work in
any circumstance.7 2
The court rejected this argument, as it found nothing in the
language of §§ 1201 or 1202 showing that the two sections were
The court
designed to have interrelated interpretations."
explained, "[s]ection 1201 does not mention 'copyright
management information'; in fact, it does not refer to § 1202 at all.
... Similarly, § 1202 does not refer to § 1201, and the definition of
CMI is located squarely in § 1202."74 The court found that §§
1201 and 1202 establish independent causes of action that arise
from different conduct on the part of the defendants, albeit with
similar remedies.
3. The Legislative History of the DMCA ProvidesNo
ExtraordinaryShowing ofIntentions Contrary to the Plain
LanguageReading of§ 1202
Finding the language of § 1202(c) unambiguous both in
isolation and in statutory context, the Third Circuit next looked to
the legislative history of the DMCA in search of an "extraordinary

71.
LLC,
72.
73.
74.
75.

Def. Brief, supra note 68, at 11 (quoting IQ Grp., Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ'g,
409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (D.N.J. 2006)) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 12.
Murphy, 650 F.3d at 303.
Id.
Id.
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showing of contrary intentions" that would justify a rejection of its
plain reading of the statutory language." The court found no such
showing."
The Station Defendants primarily relied on the legislative review
performed by the district courts in IQ Group and Textile Secrets."
In IQ Group, the district court placed emphasis on the IITF white
paper, which it found to be a clear indication of legislative intent
contrary to the statute's plain language. Here, the Third Circuit
quoted the following excerpt from the white paper:
[a] combination of file- and system-based access
controls using encryption technologies, digital
signatures and steganography are . . . employed by

owners of works to address copyright management
concerns.

.

. . To

implement

these

rights

management functions, information will likely be
included in digital versions of a work (i.e.,
copyright management information) to inform the
user about the authorship and ownership of a work.
79

The IQ court concluded that the use of "copyright management
information" in the quoted context indicated a congressional intent
to limit the scope of CMI to such that functions as part of "rights
management systems."s0 Finally, the IQ court deduced that,
"[s]uch systems are conceived of as electronic and automated
This final
within the environment of a computer network."'
deduction, also advanced here by the Station Defendants, fell short
in the Third Circuit's view: "[the white paper] description leaves
the question of just how [CMI] will be included-that is whether it
must be used in some form of an 'automated copyright protection

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 303.
Murphy, 650 F.3d at 304 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
IQ Grp., 409 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
Id.
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or management system' or whether it can be conveyed by other
means--entirely open."8 2
The court then reviewed the WIPO treaties. Recall that these
treaties only required signatories to provide remedies against the
removal or alteration of any electronic rights management
information ("ERMI")." Defendants asserted that because the
DMCA was passed to implement the WIPO treaties, and nothing
in the legislative record explicitly indicated intent to assign
broader meaning to CMI than ERMI, the two terms must be
synonymous.84
The Third Circuit conceded "some force" to this argument, but
nonetheless concluded that the submitted legislative history did not
provide the "extraordinary showing of contrary intentions"
necessary to disregard the plain language of § 1202(c)." At best,
the court found the legislative history consistent with the
Defendants' interpretation of § 1202, but found nothing that
explicitly contradicted the plain meaning interpretation advocated
by Murphy." Furthermore, the court stated that Congress was
certainly free, in implementing the WIPO treaties, to define CMI
more broadly than ERMI."
4. Policy Concerns
The court addressed certain policy concerns in dicta and
footnotes. The court acknowledged that its plain language reading
of § 1202 is extremely broad, and places no restriction on the
context in which information must be used in order to qualify as
CMI." The court conceded that "such an interpretation might well
82. Murphy,650 F.3d at 304 (emphasis in original).
83. See WIPO Copyright, supra note 31, at 11.
84. Murphy, 650 F.3d 295 at 304.
85. Id. at 304-05.
86. The court noted that although the WIPO treaties' definition of "electronic
rights management information" is situated in the context of a broader
discussion of rights management systems, the definition does not explicitly
require that such information be used in connection with such systems to qualify
as ERMI. Id. at 304-05.
87. Id. at 305.
88. Id. at 302.
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provide an additional cause of action under the DMCA in many
circumstances in which only an action for copyright infringement
could have been brought previously."89 Nevertheless, the court did
not find this "absurd."" Indeed, the court wrote, "it is undisputed
that the DMCA was intended to expand ... the rights of copyright
owners."" Thus, in the court's view, the creation of an additional
cause of action was entirely consistent with the purpose of the
statute.92 "If there is a difficulty here," the court wrote, "it is a
problem of policy, not of logic."
As illustrative of this "problem of policy," the Station
Defendants argued that the plain language reading of § 1202
allows the DMCA to "swallow up" the Copyright Act, effectively
rendering the latter redundant.94 The court countered that an
infringer who "merely copies" an entire work, without removing
CMI, will face liability under the Copyright Act, but escape
prosecution under § 1202.95 The court used the example of a
pirated DVD." So long as the infringer does not edit out the
credits, he will not have violated § 1202 because he presumably
will not have removed any CMI."
The Station Defendants further asserted that the broad
interpretation would effectively curtail fair use, since most fair
uses will involve the removal of CMI." Here, the Court invoked §
1202's mental elements.99 Because § 1202(b) only applies when a
defendant knows or has reasonable grounds to know that removal
will "induce, enable, facilitate or conceal" an infringement, and
those intending to make a legitimate fair use lack this mindset, the
court concluded that fair use was not threatened by its holding. 00
89. Id.
90. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302.
91. Id. at 303.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 302.
94. Id. n.8.
95. Id.
96. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302 n.8.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. n.8.
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5. The Third CircuitHeld that Print Credits May Qualify as CM!
The Third Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants on all counts.'"' The court
found that CMI, as defined in § 1202(c), is not restricted to the
context of "automated copyright protection or management
systems." 0 2 Rather, a cause of action under § 1202 of the DMCA
potentially lies whenever the types of information listed in §
1202(c)(1)-(8) and "conveyed in connection with copies . . . of a
work . . . including in digital form" is falsified or removed,

regardless of the form in which that information is conveyed.'os
Thus, the court held that the fact that Murphy's name appeared in a
printed gutter credit near the Image rather than as data in an
"automated copyright protection or management system" did not
prevent it from qualifying as CMI or remove it from the protection
of § 1202."*
IV. ANALYSIS
At first glance, the Murphy decision appears disharmonious with
intuitive understanding of the DMCA, namely that the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act could not possibly extend to protect an
analog print credit. Nonetheless, the plain language of § 1202 is
indisputably broad, and the statute's murky legislative history
sheds far less guidance on the issue than the Station Defendants
would lead one to believe."' While it is likely that Congress did
intend to extend § 1202 protection to print credits in certain
hypothetical circumstances where a credit serves a given function,
the record only offers vague and often contradictory guidance as to
what those protected functions would be. It is therefore difficult to
demonstrate an "extraordinary showing" of congressional intent
necessary to limit § 1202's applicability to the context of § 1201

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
note 8,

Id. at310.
Murphy, 650 F.3d at 305.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Other legal scholars have noted as much. See, e.g., Lastowka, supra
at 71 ("Looking at the legislative history simply clouds the issue.").
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functionality. Given this burden, the Third Circuit was justified to
reject the narrow interpretation of § 1202 advanced by the Station
Defendants. However, the Third Circuit's holding that a § 1202
cause of action arises upon any falsification, alteration or removal
of enumerated CMI is demonstrably at odds with the policy aims
of the DMCA as a whole. Instead, an objective standard requiring
some factual nexus between the defendant's act and an
unauthorized digital distribution is appropriate for a claim to
survive summary judgment. This nexus was present in Murphy,
and because a trier of fact must determine whether the Station
Defendants' possessed the requisite mental states, Murphy's claim
cannot be decided as a matter of law. Thus, in spite of its
overbroad holding, the Third Circuit was nevertheless correct to
vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment.
A. Mere Analog Formattingofa PrintCreditDoes not Preclude a
§ 1202 Claim
The plain language of § 1202(c) does not make the form of CMI
determinative. Rather, the statute uses the non-exclusive phrase
"including in digital form" as the only formatting requisite in its
definition of CMI. 106 In spite of this non-exclusive language, the
Third Circuit conceded some weight to the Station Defendants'
argument that "electronic rights management information," as
used by the WIPO treaties, and "copyright management
information," as used by Congress, were intended to be
coterminous in scope.o' In their brief, the Station Defendants
argued,
If Plaintiff wants to speculate that Congress might
have intended CMI to be broader than ERMI, he
can do so, but then he must acknowledge the need
for this Court to consult legislative history of the

106. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
107. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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DMCA. There is no evidence in the legislative
history of any such intent.'"
Unfortunately for the Defendants, such evidence does exist in
the record. In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee,
the Register of Copyrights specifically addressed and applauded
the expanded scope of CMI compared to ERMI:
We believe that the proposed section 1202 in this
bill adequately and appropriately implements the
treaty obligation . . . . It goes beyond the bare

minimum obligation in several respects, mainly in
covering the provision of false information and
information not in electronic form. In our view,
these extensions are useful and appropriate.'O9
Congress was thus made aware that its statutory language
exceeded the treaty obligation, and was advised by the Copyright
Office that the expanded scope was "useful and appropriate."
Therefore, the Defendants' argument that Congress intended to
limit the scope of CMI to electronic rights management
information is not sustainable.
Moreover, the exemptions granted by § 1202(e) indicate that
Congress appreciated the scope of its broad definition in § 1202(c).
Recall that § 1202(e) creates an exemption for analog broadcasters
who remove CMI in instances where avoiding the removal is "not
technically feasible or would create an undue financial
hardship.""o For example, a broadcaster that interrupts film
credits with an emergency news bulletin would not be liable."'
The scenario implies, however, that analog film credits could
function as CMI under, at minimum, some circumstances, and it
follows that if analog film credits may function as CMI, analog
print credits likely qualify as CMI under the same circumstances.
In sum, Congress did not establish a formatting threshold for CMI.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Def. Brief, supra note 68, at 16 (emphasis in original).
Peters Statement, supra note 46 (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 1202(e)(1)(A).
Peters Statement, supra note 46.
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B. The LegislativeRecord Offers Only Vague and Contradictory
Guidance on the Functional Thresholdof CMT
The issue becomes far murkier when attempting to determine
the circumstances under which an analog credit may qualify as
CMI. Since the statute does not limit CMI's form, such a
determination must be made based on a functional or other
circumstantial threshold. Realizing this, the Station Defendants
argued that CMI is only protected when it functions as part of an
automated copyright protection system or "technological measure"
afforded protection in § 1201.112 As the Third Circuit correctly
noted, however, the plain language of the statute imposes no such
functional requirement."' In fact the only verb appearing in the
statutory definition of CMI that describes the information's
function is "[to] identifly]."" 4 The statute itself offers no guidance
as to who or what is on the receiving end of the identifying
information, or what the receiver is to do with that information. "
Looking to the legislative record offers little further definitive
assistance. For one, the record is sparse."' Moreover, the little
discussion that does exist is vague. The Senate Report introduces
the CMI provisions with an ambiguous assertion of CMI's
function: "Copyright Management Information (CMI) is an
important element in establishing an efficient Internet marketplace
in copyrighted works free from governmental regulation. Such
information will assist in tracking and monitoring uses of
copyrighted works, as well as licensing of rights and indicating
attribution, creation and ownership.""' Based on this statement,
one might interpret "assist[ing] in tracking and monitoring uses of
112. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302.
113. Id.
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
115. See id.
116. The Senate Judiciary Report recommending passage of the DMCA
offers five pages of policy discussion of § 1201's anticircumvention measures,
but only four paragraphs, amounting to less than a page, on § 1202's CMI
provisions. See HATCH, supra note 35, at 11-17. Specific policy discussing in
the House Reports is no more becoming, offering only a few scattered
sentences.
117. Id. at 16.
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copyrighted works" as the threshold function qualifying CMI.
Under this interpretation, the more expansive licensing and
identifying functions following the initial clause are exemplary
secondary features which are diminished in importance by the use
of "as well as." Since it is hard to imagine CMI "tracking and
monitoring uses" outside the context of an automated or digital
system, this interpretation lends credence to the Station
Defendants' position. An alternate interpretation, however, might
posit that none of the listed functions are a threshold, but rather
that all are potential functions of CMI. Under this interpretation,
any information enumerated in § 1202(c) would qualify as CMI if
it assisted in the "licensing of rights and indicated attribution,
creation and ownership." This more expansive interpretation is
bolstered elsewhere in the Report, where the Senate broadly notes,
"[t]he purpose of CMI is to facilitate licensing of copyright for use
on the Internet and to discourage piracy.""' Here, "tracking and
monitoring" is not even listed as a purpose,"' and so it is difficult
to conclude that the Senate definitively considered "tracking and
monitoring" a threshold function. More importantly, all of the
information enumerated in § 1202 arguably facilitates Internet
licensing and discourages piracy regardless of whether it functions
in an automated system.'20
The House Report is, if anything, more opaque. It states,
"[s]ection 1202' . . . is required .

.

. to ensure the integrity of the

electronic marketplace by preventing fraud and misinformation...
. This section will operate to protect consumers from
misinformation as well as authors and copyright owners from

118. HATCH, supra note 35,at 11 n.18.
119. See id.
120. The print credit in Murphy, for example, could have pointed potential
licensees to contact Murphy to discuss an internet licensing agreement. Though
not automated, human-to-human licensing negotiations are a method of
copyright management. The credit may also have served as an admittedly weak
deterrent to digital piracy. Had Internet users seen the credit, they would have
been put on notice that further copying and distribution would require
permission of the copyright owner. With this notice, some users, who may
otherwise act differently, would not copy or redistribute the Image, or may have
to seek permission before doing so.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

21

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

506

DEPA UL 1 ART, TECH. & IP LAW

[Vol. XXII:485

interference with the private licensing process." 2 ' Again, the
record leaves open just how CMI accomplishes "preventing fraud
and misinformation." Since a false print credit is just as deceptive
as false data, "protection from fraud and misinformation" could be
equally necessary outside of automated rights management
systems as in. The latter clause, in which CMI protects "authors
and copyright owners from interference with the private licensing
process,"l2 presumably refers to CMI's ability to function within
a technological system that "effectively controls access to a work"
or "effectively protects a right of a copyright owner," but, again,
the House's description does not expressly limit CMI's function to
those abilities.
The most luminous source of legislative intent remains the IITF
white paper, but it offers inconsistent guidance as well. IQ Group
primarily relied on a white paper passage that explicitly refers to
CMI's role in rights management systems to conclude that CMI is
limited to components of technological measures that protect
copyright, and that § 1202 does not cover copyright management
performed by people.123 This conclusion, however, ignores later
passages in the white paper that describe CMI functioning in
human-performed copyright management systems.124 Unlike later
versions of § 1202-including the version enacted by Congressthe white paper's proposed statutory definition of CMI imposed no
requirement that the information be conveyed in connection with
copies or phonograms of a work.125 The white paper explains its
proposal's lack of such a requirement, reasoning "[m]any users

121. HOWARD COBLE, WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATIES IMPLEMENTATION AND
ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY LIMITATION, H. REP. No. 105551,pt. 1, at 10-11 (1998).
122. Id.
123. IQ Grp.., Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ'g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597
(D.N.J. 2006).
124. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 236.
125. Id. at 236 ("[t]he proposal prohibits the falsification, alteration or
removal of any copyright management information -- not just that which is
included in or digitally linked to the copyrighted work."); compare id. app. I at
7, with 17 U.S.C § 1202(c).
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will obtain such information from public registers, where the
integrity of such information will be no less important."26
The white paper makes clear that its proposed legislation
protected such information regardless of whether it is included in
or digitally linked to a copyrighted work, and that the integrity of
information filed in such registers will be "no less important" than
information that is included or digitally linked.'27 If users would
have to seek out the information stored in these registers because it
wasn't linked to the work, however, the protected method of
copyright management could not be considered "automated."
Rather, it would be a type of "copyright management performed
by people" that the IQ court mistakenly asserted the white paper
did not intend to protect. While Congress later nullified the
described passage of the white paper by requiring that CMI be
conveyed in connection with a copy of a work, the passage
nonetheless shows that the earliest conceptions of CMI were
broader in scope than the IQ court believed, and cannot be used to
conclusively clarify the vagaries of the later congressional record.
It is quite plausible, and perhaps even likely, that some
legislators believed that CMI's role was limited to § 1201
technological measures. First, as the IQ court succinctly put it,
this interpretation just "makes sense" 28 and imbues an internal
coherence to the DMCA that the Act otherwise lacks. Looking at
the DMCA as a whole, §§ 1201 and 1202 are situated in a
common chapter titled "Copyright Protection and Management
Systems." If a congressman were only to glance at the chapter and
section titles without carefully reading the sections' texts-which
contain no references to one another-it would be natural to
deduce that § 1201 (titled "Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems") protects the systems themselves while § 1202 protects
the information used in the functioning of the systems.129
126. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 236.

127. Id.
128. IQ Grp., 409 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
129. David Nimmer has written extensively about the legislature's apparent
misunderstanding of the DMCA, going so far as to write, "[i]f one draws at
random any particular floor commentary concerning the copyright amendments
passed in October 1998, the odds are high that it completely misstates the law as
it actually appears on the books today." Nimmer, supra note 36, at 933.
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Second, the record most often plants its policy arguments for the
DMCA within a technological framework. For example, the
Copyright Office has repeatedly described §§ 1201 and 1202 as
"technological adjuncts" to the Copyright Act.130 Moreover, part II
of the House Judiciary Report, under a section titled "Background
and Need for Legislation," enumerates six specific aims of the
DMCA: Promoting Electronic Commerce, Understanding the
Nexus Between Electronic Commerce and Intellectual Property,
Prohibiting Certain Devices, Protecting Fair use in the Digital
Environment, Promoting Encryption Research, and Protecting
Personal Privacy in the Digital Environment.13 ' These aims, all
technological, are, at best, only indirectly served by the protection
of information that is not, at some point, processed by an
automated system.
Finally, § 1202's nonexclusive language pertaining to form can
be explained by the legislature's desire to avoid placing
inadvertent restrictions on the development of CMI.'32
Furthermore, imposing a requirement that CMI function as part of
an automated system would likely have created compliance issues

130. See Peters Statement, supra note 46; see also THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 3
(1998), available at www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf
131. THOMAS BLILEY, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, H.
REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21-28 (1998).
132. This explanation is supported by the record. See Hearing on H.R. 2180
andH.R. 2281 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Robert Holleyman, President, Business Software
Alliance) ("Finally, with respect to both copyright protection systems and
copyright management systems, we support the bill's approach in that it does
not establish standard technologies and formats which these measures must take.
Technology in these areas is developing rapidly. To establish a specific standard
or format at this time would fossilize existing systems, and cause us to lose the
benefit of future innovation. Thus we fully support the approach which would
leave the marketplace to develop the particular systems used."), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/464.htm. Although the author is not aware of
a copyright management system that reads and processes analog credits, it is not
difficult to imagine the development of such a system. For instance, a
smartphone application might use the phone's camera to take a picture of a
credit, process the image to extract the text, and run that text as a search query
in a licensing database.
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with the WIPO treaties, which contain no such functional
requirement. "

Nonetheless, the Station Defendants had the burden of
demonstrating an "extraordinary showing of contrary legislative
intent," 34 and given the vagaries and inconsistencies of the record,
as well as the number of inferences necessary to support an
argument that Congress so intended to limit § 1202 to the § 1201
context of automated systems, it is difficult to fault the Third
Circuit for concluding that this high burden had not been met. If
Congress did, in fact, intend to narrow § 1202 with a functional
threshold as argued, the Third Circuit's over-inclusive
interpretation of the statute serves as a cautionary tale of the perils
of preemptively regulating little-understood emerging technologies
whose development is ongoing and rapid.
C. The Third Circuit Adopted a StandardThat is Too Broad
Whatever CMI's form or function, the Third Circuit's holding
that "a cause of action under § 1202 of the DMCA potentially lies
whenever the types of information listed in § 1202(c)(1)-(8) and
'conveyed in connection with copies ... of a work .. . including in
digital form' is falsified or removed, regardless of the form in
which that information is conveyed" goes too far."' The IITF
white paper, the WIPO treaties, and the DMCA were all
undoubtedly prompted by the problems digital networks posed to
copyright owners. Namely that "[d]ue to the ease with which
digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually
instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their
works readily available on the Internet without reasonable
assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy.""'
The Third Circuit's interpretation would make the statute
applicable in cases that do not involve the Internet or digital

133. See WIPO Copyright, supra note 31, at 11; see also WIPO PPT, supra
note 32, at 18-42.
134. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
136. HATCH, supranote 35, at 8.
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networks, and, thus, fall outside even the broadest asserted
legislative purpose of the statute.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit even conceded that its broad
interpretation might create a "problem of policy" because it "might
well provide an additional cause of action under the DMCA in
many circumstances in which only an action for copyright
infringement could have been brought previously."' Despite the
white paper's purport to recommend "only those changes that are
essential to adapt the law to the needs of the global information
society,"' the Third Circuit did not find its "problem of policy"
"absurd,"' and without further inquiry found it "undisputed that
the DMCA was intended to expand . . . the rights of copyright

owners."' 4 0 The Third Circuit's major failing in Murphy, thus, was
its willingness to conceptualize the DMCA as an arbitrary grant of
expanded rights to copyright owners without properly considering
the purpose of that grant.14
* Because the DMCA was a response to the proliferation of digital
infrastructure, a narrower interpretation of § 1202 based on a
circumstantial threshold, akin to the court's interpretation in
Textile Secrets International, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc., is more
proper. This standard merely requires factual circumstances that
involve some "relation to the Internet, electronic commerce,
automated copyright protections or management systems, public
137. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302.
138. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 2.

139. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302.
140. Id. at 303.
141. The Third Circuit explained its neglect thusly:
As for the purpose of the statute as a whole, it is undisputed
that the DMCA was intended to expand .

.

. the rights of

copyright owners. The parties here differ only as to their
conclusions regarding the extent to which the DMCA
expanded those rights. Murphy's definition of CMI provides
for a significantly broader cause of action than the Station
Defendants' does. However, the Station Defendants can point
to nothing in the statute as a whole which compels the
adoption of their reading instead of Murphy's. In short,
considering the purpose of the statute does not provide us with
meaningful guidance in this case.
Id.
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registers, or other technological measures or processes as
contemplated in the DMCA as a whole," 4 2 before § 1202 will
apply.
The facts of Textile Secrets demonstrate the wisdom of this
interpretation. The asserted CMI at issue was a notice of copyright
printed on the selvage' 43 of a copyrighted fabric design, and also on
a removable tag affixed to the work.1' This notice included the
plaintiffs name.'4 5 As part of an infringement suit, the plaintiff
copyright owner claimed that the defendant's removal of the
selvage and tag constituted a removal of CMI in violation of §
1202.146 The printed information did not include a bar code or
other marker that could be electronically scanned, nor did the
defendants scan or otherwise digitize the design so that it could be
In other words, the factual
disseminated electronically.'4 7
circumstances of the case fell completely outside the digital realm.
Nonetheless, under the Third Circuit's plain language
interpretation in Murphy, these facts would fall within the scope of
the DMCA because they involved removal of enumerated CMI.1'
The Textile Secrets court, however, rightly concluded that
Congress did not intend § 1202 to apply in such circumstances.'4 9
Murphy is distinguishable from Textile Secrets because, unlike
the defendants there, the Station Defendants digitized the work and
made it available for electronic dissemination on the Internet.
Applying Textile Secrets interpretation would, thus, have led to the
same result reached by the Third Circuit, but would not have
exceeded the broadest discernable policy goals of Congress.

142. Textile Secrets Int'l, Inc. v. Ya-ya Brand, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184,
1201 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
143. The edge or border of the fabric that is intended to be cut off and
discarded.
144. Textile Secrets, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93.
145. Id. at 1192.
146. Id. at 1193.
147. Id. at n.16.
148. Section 1202(c)(3) includes "[t]he name of, and other identifying
information about, the copyright owner of the work, including the information
set forth in a notice of copyright," in the statutory definition of CMI. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1202(c)(3).
149. Textile Secrets, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
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V. IMPACT
Pending other circuits' chance to evaluate § 1202, it is too early
to appreciate the extent of Murphy's adoption. With that said,
even before the Third Circuit reached its decision, a growing
number of district courts were adopting broad constructions of
CMI.5'o Following Murphy, however, at least one district court
appreciated that unrestricted plain language application of § 1202
runs contrary to legislative intent. On a motion to dismiss in
Brown v. Stroud, the court rejected the defendant's contention that
CMI need be electronic or function in an automated system, but
nonetheless could not "turn a blind eye to the purposes for which
the DMCA was enacted."'"' Accordingly, the court adopted the
Textile Secrets standard, and gave the plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint to comport.'5 2 Other circuits would be wise to follow
this course.
Several commentators, primarily evaluating the efficacy of §
1202 as a moral rights provision, have noted that the plain
language reach of § 1202 is already effectively mitigated by the
mental states.'5 3 To bring a successful claim, a plaintiff must prove

150. Brown v. Stroud, No. C 08-02348 JSW, 2011 WL 2600661, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. June 30, 2011) (citing Agence France Press v. Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Faulkner Press, L.L.C. v. Class Notes, L.L.C., 756 F. Supp. 2d
1352, 1359 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (plain language did not limit definition of CMI to
"notices that are placed on works through technological processes," but finding
no violation of DMCA); Cable v. Agence France Presse, 728 F. Supp. 2d 977,
980-81 (N.D. 111. 2010); Interplan Architect, Inc. v. C.L. Thomas, Inc., No.
4:08-cv-03181, 2009 WL 6443117, at *3-5 (S.D. Tex. Nov.13, 2009); Fox v.
Hildebrand, No. CV 09-2085 DSF (VBKx), 2009 WL 1977996, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
July 1, 2009) (declining to look to legislative history where "[tlhe plain
language of the DMCA provision at issue is not limited to copyright notices that
are digitally placed on a work).
151. Id.
152. Id. at *6.
153. See, e.g., Lastowka, supra note 8, at 73 ("With regard to the removal of
CMI, plaintiffs often fail because their claims do not involve an assertion of
their economic rights. In order to prove liability under the CMI provisions in §
1202(b), a plaintiff must essentially prove that a defendant was expressly
contemplating copyright infringement when removing or distributing the
information without the required CMI."); Jane Ginsburg, Art and the Law:
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that a defendant had reasonable grounds to know that his act would
induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement, and that he
intentionally removed or altered CMI, or distributed a work
knowing that information had been removed or altered.154 While
this sets a high burden for the plaintiff at trial, these mental
elements cannot effectively curb the statute's reach at the summary
judgment phase because determination of mental state is an issue
of fact that each party is likely to dispute, and no case law
currently exists that outlines circumstances under which a
defendant would have reasonable grounds to know that his act will
induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement."' Assuming
the plaintiff has admissible evidence of the requisite mental states,
his claim must go forward."' While these threshold inquiries into
a defendant's mental state may indeed limit the application of the
DMCA, the mental elements alone are insufficient to mitigate the
statute's reach in the practical context of litigation.

Suppression and Liberty - Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital)Age in the
United States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 13 (2001) ("[Slection 1202
falls short of the WIPO treaty requirement, because section 1202 concerns only
copyright management information whose removal or alteration facilitates or
conceals copyright infringement.").
154. 17 U.S.C. § 1202. In Murphy, for example, the plaintiff will have to
prove that the station employee who scanned the Image intentionally cropped
off the gutter credit, that the station knew the credit originally accompanied the
Image and had been removed when it posted the Image to the Internet, and that
all actors had reasonable grounds to know that their acts would induce, enable,
facilitate or conceal an infringement.
155. Section 1202 claims that have been decided on summary judgment
typically involve works that were not protected by copyright in the first place
(see, e.g., Thron v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5437, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13670, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002)), or where plaintiffs could
not show that defendants distributed works with actual knowledge that CMI had
been removed (see, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns, 345 F.3d 922, 923, 927
(6th Cir. 2003)).
156. While courts have been reluctant to infer mere knowledge of removal
(see supra note 154), at least one court has held that intentional removal could
reasonably be inferred from the nature of the defendant's business. McClatchey
v. Associated Press, 3:05-cv-145, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17768, at *16-17
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2007). When intent can be inferred, the plaintiffs
evidentiary burden at summary judgment is low.
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In effect, the Third Circuit's broad interpretation of § 1202,
together with Congress' misguided reliance on mental states to
curb the statute's application, creates the opportunity for legal
intimidation and heightened infringement settlements. Whereas
statutory infringement damages for copyright infringement may be
as little as $750,'15 a successful § 1202 claimant is entitled to
$2,500 and may receive as much as $25,000 in statutory
damages.'
Simply tacking a § 1202 claim to an infringement
complaint therefore raises a defendant's minimum damages payout
by over 300%, and leverages the plaintiffs ability to negotiate
higher settlements. Given today's high costs of litigation and the
unlikelihood under Murphy that a § 1202 claim can be defeated on
a motion to dismiss or at summary judgment, such exaggerated
settlements are likely even in cases that fall completely outside the
digital realm. This problem of policy exceeds all discernible aims
of Congress, and cannot be dismissed.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit justifiably held that Murphy's § 1202 claim
could not be decided as a matter of law. In doing so, however, it
adopted an overbroad standard that allows for DMCA claims
against purely analog forms of infringement, exceeding the bounds
of legislative intent. The record does not support a formal
threshold that qualifies CMI, and is far too murky to establish a
functional threshold. Accordingly, a circumstantial threshold
requiring some factual nexus between the defendant's act and a
subsequent unauthorized distribution on a digital network is both
consistent with the legislative intent and an appropriate threshold
for a claim to survive summary judgment.
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